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SYMPOSIUM
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO
NON-TESTIFYING EXPERTS:
REESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND THE WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
"One of [the] realities [of litigation in our adversary system] is that attor-
neys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in
the compilation of materials in preparation for trial."
- Mr. Justice Powell in an opinion joined in by
Mr. Justice Brennan in United States v. Nobles.'
In the 1989 Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture which inspired this
symposium, Mr. Justice Brennan spoke out in favor of more reciprocal
discovery in criminal cases.' A strong case certainly can be made for
allowing the criminal defendant fuller discovery.3 However, because dis-
covery is designed to be a two-way street, we cannot overlook the ques-
tion of the adequacy of prosecution discovery in criminal cases.
One of the principal impediments to prosecution discovery is the exist-
ence of common-law and statutory privileges such as those surrounding
the attorney-client and physician-patient relationships. Privileges ob-
struct factual inquiry and can result in the suppression of relevant, relia-
* Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis. The author would like to express his
appreciation to Ms. Lei-Chala Wilson, Class of 1989, University of California, at Davis, Ms. Ester
Rogers, Class of 1990, and Mr. Joseph Deulloa, Class of 1991, who served as the author's research
assistants on this project. The author would also like to thank Professor Ronald Allen of North-
western University, who kindly reviewed an earlier draft of this article.
1. 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
2. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth? 4 Progress Report,
68 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1990).
3. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1987). Mr. Justice Brennan cites this
article at several points in the footnotes to the text of his remarks. Brennan, supra note 2, at 3 n.4, 6
n.20, n.49.
Washington University Open Scholarship
20 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ble evidence. For that reason, the Supreme Court has observed that
"[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored .... ." The general
trend in privilege law bears out the Court's observation. The courts have
not only been reluctant to create new privileges;' in many cases, they
also have expanded waiver doctrines6 and special exceptions7 to defeat
privilege claims.
There is, however, a notable exception to this trend: the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege to experts hired by litigators as pretrial
consultants. Suppose, for example, that before trial, criminal defense
counsel is trying to decide whether to advise her client to plead insanity.
She hires a psychiatrist as an expert consultant to evaluate her client.
The psychiatrist meets with the client and then submits a report to coun-
sel which concludes that the defendant was sane at the time of the actus
reus. Although the defense ultimately decides to present an insanity de-
fense, counsel understandably decides against calling this psychiatrist as
a witness. However, can the prosecutor call the psychiatrist or obtain a
copy of the psychiatrist's report to defense counsel?
The defense cannot rely on any privilege other than attorney-client to
block the prosecution's discovery attempts. Even if the psychiatrist is a
licensed physician in the jurisdiction, the defense cannot rely on the phy-
sician-patient privilege for several reasons: most jurisdictions limit the
privilege to civil cases,8 the privilege applies only when the client consults
the physician with a view to treatment, 9 and the patient-litigant excep-
tion to the privilege comes into play when the defense places the client's
mental condition in issue by pleading insanity. ° Likewise, the defense
cannot successfully invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Although many jurisdictions recognize that privilege in criminal cases,
they apply the privilege only when the client consults the psychotherapist
4. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979).
5. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1443 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
7. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Con-
templated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L. REV. 443 (1986). See also United States v. Zolin, 109 S.
Ct. 2619 (1989).
8. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVI-
DENCE 605 (2d ed. 1986).
9. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 215, at 844 (1985).
10. 2 J. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 12.19 (4th ed.
1988).
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with a treatment motive."1 Moreover, as in the case of the physician-
patient privilege, under the patient-litigant exception the client waives
the psychotherapist privilege by raising an insanity defense.1" Finally,
the defense cannot argue that the work product doctrine altogether bars
prosecution discovery. Some jurisdictions do not accord any material
absolute protection under the work product doctrine. 3 Other jurisdic-
tions do so by statute or common law, but they tend to confine absolute
work product protection to written material reflecting the attorney's per-
sonal mental impressions and legal theories. 4
Can the defense rely on the attorney-client privilege to block the prose-
cution's discovery efforts? 5 The early view was that the privilege was
inapplicable. 6  With the support of respected commentators, 17 some ju-
risdictions still adhere to that view. 8 However, a sharp split in authority
exists on the question."9 A large body of case law extends the attorney-
client privilege to expert information." Since the mid-1970s, there has
11. Id. § 12.21, at 145.
12. Id. § 12.24.
13. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 653.
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Feldman, The Work Product Rule in Criminal Practice and
Procedure, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 495 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 136 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) ("With respect to a lawyer's work on a client's cause in anticipation
of litigation or for trial, the lawyer may invoke on behalf of the client an immunity: (1) That
absolutely bars from discovery or evidentiary use the mental impressions and other thought
processes of the lawyer .... ").
15. Simon, Pretrial Discovery of Expert Information in Federal and State Courts: A Guide for
the Expert, 5 J. POLICE SCL & ADMIN. 247 (1977).
16. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016 (1970).
17. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV.
455 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L.
REV. 665, 699 (1964); Note, Discovery of Retained Nontestifying Experts' Identities Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 MICH. L. REV. 513, 520-21 (1982). The Note asserts that the
Friedenthal and Long articles had "thoroughly debunked the notion" that the attorney-client privi-
lege applies. Id. at 520 n.33. However, like the reports of Mark Twain's death, the assertion of the
demise of that notion turned out to be exaggerated.
18. United States v. Talley, 790 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 866 (1986); Noggle
v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983); State v. Schneider, 402
N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1987); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932
(1983).
19. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(a)(3)[01], at 503-24 to 27
(1988).
20. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Int'l. Harvester's Disposition
of Wis. Steel Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (collecting cases); United States v.
Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (one of the cases arising out of the "Jonestown massacre" in
Guyana); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979); San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
1990]
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been a marked trend favoring this extension. 21 Commentators 22 and
courts2 3 have pronounced that the trend has now attained the status of
the majority view in the United States. One court stated that today the
view is "almost universally accepted ... ."I' The California Evidence
Code adopts the view,25 and the advisory committee's note to proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 503 on the attorney-client privilege supports
the view as well.26
The courts have carried the majority view to great lengths. For exam-
ple, they recognize the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to ex-
pert information in both civil and criminal cases.2 7 They apply the
doctrine to a wide variety of experts, including psychiatrists,28 physi-
cians,29 polygraphists, 30 accountants, 3  questioned document examin-
ers,32 engineers, 33 and appraisers.34  The cases almost uniformly hold
that the expert's written report is immune from discovery. 5 Moreover, a
2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); State v. Melvins, 155 N.J. Super. 316, 382 A.2d 925 (1978); Burney v.
State, 642 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
21. United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affld, 556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); Annotation, Applicability of Attorney-Client
Privilege to Communications Made in Presence of or Solely to or by Third Person, 14 A.L.R. 4th 594,
606 (1982).
22. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10 at 238 ("substantial majority"); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 19, f 503(a)(3)[01], at 503-28 n.16 (1988) ("clear majority view"); Matte,
Privileged Communications between Attorney-Client-Polygraphist, 51 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 466, 501
(1979); Casenote, Disclosures by Criminal Defendant to Defense-Retained Psychiatrist Hold Within
Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege which Defendant Does Not Waive by Pleading Insanity, 9 BALT. L.
REV. 99, 111 (1979) ("overwhelming majority"); Casenote, Narrowing the Attorney-Client Privilege:
A Crippling Blow to the Insanity Defense, 51 UMKC L. REV. 386, 397 (1983) ("the vast majority").
23. Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1987); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 62
(Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497 (Nev. 1987).
24. State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 520, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (1979).
25. 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5485,
at 389-90 (1986) (discussing California Evidence Code § 952 and the accompanying California Law
Revision Commission comment).
26. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL RULES § 503.1, at 317 (2d ed. 1986).
27. Matte, supra note 22, at 500.
28. State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979).
29. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
30. Matte, supra note 22, at 501.
31. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 19, 503(a)(3)[01], at 503-24 to 25.
32. Annotation, supra note 21, at 640-41.
33. Id. at 648-50.
34. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13:10.
35. Ballew v. State, 640 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Annotation, supra note 21, at
633, 640, 644; Casenote, Narrowing the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Crippling Blow to the Insanity
Defense, 51 UMKC L. REV. 386, 389 n.25 (1983).
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substantial number of courts accept the premise that all the witness'
knowledge is privileged. 6 On that premise, the opposition may not call
the expert as a witness at trial,37 depose the expert before trial," or per-
haps even contact the expert outside the courtroom.3 9 The cloak of se-
crecy surrounding the expert information becomes virtually impenetrable
when the attorney decides against calling the expert as a witness.4 Un-
like the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges, the at-
torney-client privilege is not subject to an automatic patient-litigant
exception;4" the defense may raise the issue of the defendant's mental
condition and yet suppress all the psychiatrist's knowledge. This expan-
sive view of the attorney-client privilege allows the attorney to insulate
completely the expert from discovery.4 2 This view effectively converts a
narrow privilege doctrine into a broad incompetency rule,43 absolutely
barring all use of the expert by the opposition.
The thesis of this Article is that the majority view is unsound and
indiscriminate.' The first part of the Article analyzes the client's direct
communications with the expert, acknowledging that, at least in some
circumstances, those communications should be protected absolutely
under the attorney-client privilege. The balance of the Article, however,
differentiates between the client's communications and the rest of the ex-
36. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 209, at 752; Friedenthal, supra note 17, at
463.
37. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784
(Alaska 1979); Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1987); Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d
875 (Colo. 1987); State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 424 A.2d 293 (1979); Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d
640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 387 A.2d 779 (1978).
38. Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10,
§ 12.7, at 96; Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 468.
39. Comment, Discovery of the Non Witness Expert Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(B), 67 IOWA L. REV. 349, 364 (1982). See also E. IMWINKELRIED & T. BLUMOFF, PRE-
TRIAL DISCOVERY: STRATEGY AND TACTICS § 4.04 (Supp. 1988).
40. If the attorney called the expert as a witness, there obviously would be a waiver of any
privilege. Brown v. Trigg, 612 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ind. 1985), af'd, 791 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir.
1986); Ballew v. State, 640 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
41. People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, 531 P.2d 793, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975); 2 J. HOGAN,
supra note 10, § 13.11, at 247-48.
42. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 236.
43. A competency rule can completely bar a person from the witness stand. R. CARLSON, E.
IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 121. In contrast, a privilege rule has the much less
drastic effect of precluding the witness from testifying to certain facts. Id. at 603-04.
44. Although in the criminal context this issue obviously has constitutional ramifications under
the fifth amendment due process clause and the privilege against self-incrimination, that constitu-
tional analysis is not within the scope of this Article. See generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400
(1988); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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pert's information, including the expert's conclusions and reasoning pro-
cess. The Article asserts that one can draw a principled distinction
between the client's communications and the rest of the expert's informa-
tion. The second part of the Article argues that the rest of the expert
information in its own right does not qualify under the attorney-client
privilege. The third and final part of the Article focuses on the admit-
tedly close relationship between the client's communications with the ex-
pert and the rest of the expert's information. This part contends that
even given the difficulty in some cases of severing the references to the
communications from the balance of the expert's report, the opposi-
tion-the prosecution in our hypothetical-is entitled to discover the bal-
ance of the report.
I. THE CLIENT'S DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE EXPERT
The statement that majority and minority views exist on the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege to expert information is an oversim-
plification. In fact, a three-way split in authority exists over whether the
attorney-client privilege attaches to the client's communications with ex-
perts such as a psychiatrist. One school of thought maintains that the
privilege does not attach.a5 The jurisdictions subscribing to this view
point out that the privilege applies only to communications between at-
torney and client and that the expert is not an attorney. A second, com-
promise school asserts that the privilege applies only if the client makes
statements to the expert or reveals to the expert private data such as his
mental condition-information which realistically emanates from the cli-
ent.46 Courts adhering to this view characterize the expert as an essential
intermediary for communication between client and attorney. 7 A third
school of thought proposes that the privilege attach whenever the attor-
ney or client discloses information to an expert consulted for purposes of
trial preparation. The cases extending the privilege to appraisers and en-
gineers embrace this position." In these cases, at the attorney's request
the expert evaluated property viewable by the public and sometimes even
in the opposing party's possession.
In the context of applying attorney-client privilege to expert consul-
45. Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983); 2 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 209, at 752 n.41.
46. Utah Dep't. of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979).
47. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10.
48. Id. § 13.10, at 239-40; Annotation, supra note 21, at 643-54.
[Vol. 68:19
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tants, as in general attorney-client privilege analysis, two factors are criti-
cal: the identity of the communicating parties and the substance of the
communication.49 Our society has decided that only certain relation-
ships are so important that they deserve the special protection of an evi-
dentiary privilege.5" In Dean Wigmore's words, the relationship must be
"one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fos-
tered."'" The identity of the communicating parties determines whether
the parties' relationship is a protected one. However, even the existence
of a protected relationship between the parties is alone insufficient to in-
voke a privilege; the information sought to be suppressed must also con-
stitute a "communication" between the parties.52 Privilege law does not
allow parties to suppress all information in their possession. The purpose
of privilege law is to promote particular relationships by facilitating the
flow of information between persons standing in the special relationship.
In light of that rationale, only communications warrant protection.
When the privilege is analyzed in terms of these two factors, neither the
first nor the third school of thought on the scope of the attorney-client
privilege represents a tenable position.
A. The Importance of the Identity of the Communicating Parties
Although the core concept of the attorney-client privilege is protection
for direct communications between the attorney and client, the privilege
should not be confined to such communications. It is often impossible or
impractical for the attorney and client to communicate personally.
Hornbook law states that the privilege extends to exchanges of informa-
tion between the client and the attorney's agent 53 or representative.
54
The problem is defining the concept of the attorney's agent. All courts
and commentators agree that clerks and secretaries fall within the defini-
tion.55 They are convenient intermediaries for communication between
49. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 457.
50. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 612.
51. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
52. Id. § 2313, at 610.
53. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 26.60[2], at 26-190 n.3 (2d ed. 1989).
54. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 19, 503(a)(3)[01], at 503-24.
55. Id.; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 51, § 2301, at 583 ("It has never been questioned that the
privilege protects communications to the attorney's clerk and his other agents (including stenogra-
phers) for rendering his services."); 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 25, § 5486, at 402.
1990]
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the attorney and client,56 and society would gain nothing by forcing at-
torneys to communicate face-to-face with clients and forego the use of
such intermediaries. 7 Similarly, all authorities concur that interpreters
qualify as attorneys' agents for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.18
In this instance, necessity justifies the application of the privilege: when
the attorney and client do not speak the same language, they could not
communicate without the interpreter's intervention. The applicability of
the privilege should not turn on the niceties of agency law;59 even when
the interpreter is not a regular employee of the attorney, the useful func-
tion performed by the interpreter justifies the extension of the privilege.
The privilege attaches even though the interpreter is technically an in-
dependent contractor.6°
A similar functional analysis of the role of the attorney's expert con-
sultant dictates that the expert ought to be considered the attorney's
agent for privilege purposes. As the Supreme Court remarked in United
States v. Nobles, "[o]ne of those realities [of litigation in our adversary
system] is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of [expert con-
sultants] in preparation for trial."6 Consulting such experts is not
merely a convenience for the attorney;62 it is a necessity.6 3 Unless the
attorney happens to be cross-trained as a psychiatrist, the attorney lacks
the expertise to investigate competently the client's mental condition. In
any matter raising a serious question about a client's mental condition,
56. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 209, at 754 (clerks, paralegals, secretaries,
office managers, and switchboard operators all are "useful functionaries of modem legal practice").
57. 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 25, § 5486, at 401.
58. Id. at 402.
59. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 comment h, illustration 8
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) ("The fact that a secretary or other representing agent is a temporary
employee or other temporary agent of the lawyer does not, by itself, deny the protection of the
privilege. The privilege may also extend to communications shared with a lawyer's communicating
or representing agents who are not directly employed by the lawyer or the lawyer's law office but
who serve as independent contractors or as employees of organizations that hire and pay the
lawyer.").
60. People v. George, 104 Misc. 2d 630, 428 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1980) (the court rejected the prose-
cutor's argument that the definition of an attorney's agent should include only direct employees of
the attorney); Matte, supra note 22, at 468 ("It is the non-lawyer's function, not his professional
status which will ultimately determine whether he will be protected by the attorney-client
privilege.").
61. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
62. Matte, supra note 22, at 469.
63. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The complexities of modern
existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling client's affairs without the help of others
. ...
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investigation of the condition is mandatory. An attorney who neglects to
investigate arguably would be guilty of ineffective assistance of counsel in
a criminal case' or malpractice in a civil action.65
The first school, by refusing to apply the attorney-client privilege even
to the client's direct communications with the expert, creates a harsh
dilemma for the attorney: it discourages resort to otherwise necessary
expert consultants by creating the risk that opposing counsel may later
call the expert to testify about the client's statements.66 As one state
supreme court judge commented, by sending the client to an expert with-
out the protection of the privilege, the attorney might well be "stick[ing
the client's] head into a noose."' 67 Commentators have charged that the
first school deals "a crippling blow" to pretrial investigation6' and makes
it "virtually impossible" to prepare adequately for trial.69
Those commentators may be guilty of hyperbole, but the first school
unquestionably deters thorough pretrial investigation.7" By consulting
the expert, the client may be creating an opposing witness.71 This oppos-
ing witness can testify to one of the most prejudicial types of evidence, an
admission from the client's own mouth. Such an admission is routinely
admissible over a hearsay objection72 and is sufficient standing alone to
support a finding of fact against the client unless there is some special
corroboration requirement.7 3 Further, the trier of fact is likely to attach
great weight to a confession by the client.74 In short, the client could be
64. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) ("The effective assistance of
counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity defense demands recognition that a defendant
be as free to communicate with a psychiatric expert as with the attorney he is assisting."); State v.
Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978); Casenote, supra note 35, at 395.
65. 2 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.22 (3d ed. 1989); D. MEISELMAN,
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 10.18 (1980).
66. Simon, supra note 15, at 249.
67. State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 63 (Mo. 1982) (Seiler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
932 (1983).
68. Casenote, supra note 35, at 386.
69. Casenote, Disclosures by Criminal Defendant to Defense-Retained Psychiatrist Hold Within
Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege which Defendant Does Not Waive by Pleading Insanity, 9 BALT. L.
REV. 99, 103 (1979).
70. Simon, supra note 15, at 265.
71. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
72. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
73. See generally R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8.
74. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1488 (1985) ("A confession may be
the most damning type of evidence ....").
1990]
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creating a monster, a witness whose testimony could potentially guaran-
tee the opposition's victory.
Moreover, the first school encourages attorneys to consult the wrong
kind of expert. If the attorney can assume that the attorney-client privi-
lege will protect the client's disclosures to the expert, the attorney confi-
dently can send the client to an objective, fair-minded expert.75 An
objective expert will give the attorney the sort of frank case evaluation7 6
the attorney needs to engage in serious settlement negotiations with the
opposition.77 However, when the attorney cannot make that assumption
but nevertheless sends the client to an expert, the attorney is much more
likely to consult an expert who will slant her views.78 One of the peren-
nial complaints about the American system of expert testimony is that
the system relies too heavily on biased, venal witnesses.79 Widespread
adoption of the first school would likely exacerbate that problem. Hence,
in the interests of justice,80 the client's direct communications with the
expert should not be discoverable.8" Rather, courts should deem them
to be communications between the client and an agent of the attorney.
B. The Importance of the Substance of the Information Transmitted
to the Expert
The last subsection explained that the identity of the communicating
parties requires the rejection of the first school, which grants the client's
communications with the expert no protection under the attorney-client
privilege. Functionally those communications should be considered
communications between a client and his attorney. The next factor, the
substance of the information transmitted to the expert, leads to a rejec-
tion of the third school's polar extreme position that the privilege should
apply whenever the attorney or client transmits information to an expert
consulted for purposes of trial preparation. That school of thought over-
75. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 251.
76. Id.
77. Comment, supra note 39, at 359.
78. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.9, at 235.
79. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 17 (3d ed. 1984); Hand, Historical and Practical Considera-
tions Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901); Ford & Holmes, Exposure of Doc-
tors' Venal Testimony, 1965 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 75; Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 485-86.
80. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 169, 201.
81. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 250.
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looks the additional requirement under privilege law that the information
to be suppressed constitute a "communication" from the client.
As previously stated, courts subscribing to the third school apply the
attorney-client privilege to the analysis of real property by appraisers and
engineers." In these cases, the expert analyzes property that at least to
an extent can be viewed by the public. The appraisal or engineering anal-
ysis sometimes relates to property owned or possessed by the opposing
party.
There is a difference in kind between a client's revelation of his mental
condition to a psychiatrist and an appraiser's evaluation of a parcel of
realty. In the former case, the client is the source of the confidential
information being divulged to the expert.8 3 The client reveals intensely
personal information to enable the expert to translate the data into a
form usable by the attorney. 4 The expert, therefore, is a conduit for
information passing from the client to the attorney.85 Statements made
by the client to the expert unquestionably constitute communications
from the client.8 6 Further, without straining common sense, the concept
of communication from the client can be expanded to encompass revela-
tions of the client's physical or mental condition 7 and perhaps confiden-
tial records. A reasonable person could characterize all of these
disclosures as revelations of information originating from the client.
However, when the attorney asks an appraiser to evaluate a parcel of
realty and the appraiser gains her knowledge by inspecting the premises,
the expert's knowledge is not based on any revelations of intensely per-
sonal information from the client.88 Passersby may be able to see every-
thing the appraiser sees. In these circumstances, the expert's knowledge
rests on sources other than communications from the client; and it is
indefensible to apply the privilege.8 9 Courts should hold the expert's
knowledge unprotected under the attorney-client privilege whether the
hiring party is the government in a civil condemnation action or the ac-
cused in a realty fraud prosecution. Or suppose that a civil or criminal
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 240-42.
84. Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
85. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 457, 465.
86. United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 524-25 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (tape recordings of inter-
views between a defendant and a psychiatrist who was not called as a trial witness).
87. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
88. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979).
89. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 466-67.
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defendant hires an accident reconstruction expert to analyze the design
of the stretch of highway where a fatal collision occurred. The defense
hopes to establish that the cause of the accident was the highway's defec-
tive design rather than the defendant's careless driving. After visiting the
accident scene and reviewing public highway department engineering
records relating to the stretch of highway, the accident reconstruction
expert forms her opinion. It is inappropriate to apply the attorney-client
privilege to her knowledge90 because the information acquired does not
constitute a communication from the client.9" Extending the attorney-
client privilege in such a situation stretches the concept of "communica-
tion" from the client beyond its breaking point.92
Hence, only the second school of thought on the scope of the attorney-
client privilege passes muster. The first school's position is flawed be-
cause it rests on an unduly narrow definition of the attorney's agent.
That definition should not depend on formalities of agency law. Instead,
the definition should encompass any person who functions as a necessary
intermediary for communication between attorney and client. The third
school's view is likewise unsound because it is based on an excessively
broad definition of communication. The definition should not encom-
pass every bit of knowledge acquired by the expert. When the client
makes statements to the expert or exposes personal information such as
his mental condition to the expert, the expert serves as a conduit for the
effective communication between client and attorney; the data realisti-
cally emanates from the client. The attorney-client privilege is designed
to incentivize the client's communication.93 However, there is no justifi-
cation for cloaking expert information with the attorney-client privilege
when the expert acquires the information from other sources.
90. Cf. Grand Lake Drive-In v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 2d 122, 3 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1960)
(in a slip and fall case, a party hired an engineering expert to evaluate the sidewalk where the slip
and fall occurred).
91. Id. at 126, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 625; San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d
194, 373 P.2d 448, 23 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1962). See also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, 1
503(A)(1)[01], at 503-28.
92. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 238.
93. Allen, Grady, Polsby & Yashko, A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Work Product Doctrine, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. - (1990).
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II. THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF THE REST OF THE EXPERT'S
INFORMATION IN ITS OWN RIGHT
A. Like the Client's Communications, Is the Rest of the Expert's
Information Entitled to Absolute Protection Under the
Attorney-Client Privilege?
The last section addressed the privileged status of the client's commu-
nications with the expert and concluded that the client's statements to
the expert and disclosures of personal information such as mental condi-
tion should be protected absolutely under the attorney-client privilege.
Courts should not allow a prosecutor or opposing civil attorney to dis-
cover the parts of an expert's report reflecting those statements and
disclosures.
However, that conclusion does not end our inquiry. The typical expert
report contains far more than recitations of the client's statements and
personal revelations. Typically, the attorney asks the expert to evaluate
the significance of the facts in the case.94 In essence, the expert's analysis
proceeds syllogistically,95 applying a major premise to a minor premise to
derive a conclusion. The minor premise consists of the case-specific in-
formation. Some of this information, such as the client's personal com-
munications, may be protected absolutely under the attorney-client
privilege. However, the minor premise often includes information from
other sources which do not merit protection under the attorney-client
privilege. The major premise is the theory or principle on which the ex-
pert relies. In a psychiatric evaluation, the expert probably will employ a
set of diagnostic criteria, a symptomatology, for the mental illness which
she suspects the defendant is suffering from. The expert will arrive at her
opinion by applying the criteria to the defendant's case history. Each
step in the expert's syllogism will be reflected at least partially in the
expert's report. The sum of the expert's information about the case thus
includes much more than the client's communications.
Does the expert's information beyond the client's communications
qualify for any privilege protection? In the past, unfortunately, courts
have tended to lump together the privileged status of the client's commu-
94. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 429 (Although an attorney
can consult an expert solely to learn either facts in the expert's possession or scientific principles with
which the expert is familiar, "by far the most common role for the expert ... is the ... role of
evaluator; the expert ... applies.., theories to the facts and draws a conclusion.").
95. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Tes-
timony, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1988).
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nications and the expert's other information. They have refused to dis-
tinguish between the different types of information in the expert's
possession.9 According to one court, "There is no distinction between
the factual data gathered by an expert and the opinions which he forms
from studying that data. If one is not privileged, neither is the other."97
However, several commenators98 and courts9 9 have recognized that
there is a distinction between the client's communications and the rest of
the expert's information. The rest of the expert's information does not
qualify as a communication from the client. Some other parts of the
expert's information, such as the ultimate opinion, may result partially
from the client's communications, but to argue that the rest of the ex-
pert's information therefore merits treatment as a privileged communica-
tion is to confuse cause and effect. The history of federal privilege law
and public policy mandate drawing a line between the client's communi-
cations with the expert and the balance of the expert's information about
the case.
1. The History of Federal Privilege Law
As Section Two B will demonstrate, expert information generally qual-
ifies for the conditional work product privilege."°° In 1970, pursuant to
statutory authority,10 ' the Supreme Court amended Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) governing the discoverability of expert informa-
tion.102 Rule 26(b)(4)(B) addresses discovery from experts whom the op-
posing side has decided not to call as trial witnesses. The current rule
provides that in "exceptional circumstances" a party may obtain discov-
ery from such experts. 103
Before the adoption of the 1970 amendments, some courts had held
that the attorney-client privilege absolutely protected information in the
possession of experts who would not testify at trial." 0 Those courts ig-
96. 2 1. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 245.
97. Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 191, 373 P.2d 439, 446, 23
Cal. Rptr. 375, 382 (1962).
98. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 469.
99. State v. Tensley, 249 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa 1977); People v. Soma, 88 Mich.App. 351, 276
N.W.2d 892 (1979) (construing the Michigan statute).
100. See infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text.
101. The current version of the statutory authority is 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
102. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 96, at 235 (3d ed. 1984).
103. Comment, supra note 39, at 350.
104. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 895, 900.
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nored the distinction between information the expert obtained from the
client's communications and information gleaned from other sources.
Emphasizing that distinction, two commentators, Dean Friedenthal0 5
and Jeremiah Long,"0 6 wrote articles in the 1960s criticizing those hold-
ings. The Advisory Committee that drafted the 1970 amendments found
those articles persuasive. The Committee not only included textual lan-
guage in Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to authorize discovery from experts the oppo-
sition had decided against calling as trial witnesses; 10 7 it also expressly
cited the two articles in the note accompanying the 1970 amendment.10
8
The note does not specifically repudiate the view that the attorney-client
privilege applies to all the expert's information.10 9 However, the combi-
nation of the approving reference to the articles and the explicit authori-
zation of discovery in Rule 26(b)(4)(B) has convinced most students of
the issue that the 1970 amendments implicitly reject the view that the
attorney-client privilege applies to the balance of the expert's
information.11 o
In addition, the language and legislative history of the Federal Rules
of Evidence suggest that Congress did not intend to repeal the discovery
authorization in Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Congress approved the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1974, and the rules took effect on July 1, 1975.111 The
draft of the rules which the Supreme Court submitted to Congress in-
cluded a proposed Rule 703 on the attorney-client privilege. 2 However,
the proposed privilege rules proved to be so controversial that Congress
balked at enacting them. 1 1 3 Instead, Congress enacted only Rule 501.14
In pertinent part, the rule reads:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness [or] person...
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
105. Friedenthal, supra note 17.
106. Long, supra note 17.
107. Comment, supra note 39, at 349.
108. Graham, supra note 104, at 907.
109. Id. at 902 n.34.
110. Id. at 901-07; Simon, supra note 15, at 250; Note, Discovery of Retained Nontestifying Ex-
perts' Identities Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 MICH L. REV. 513, 521 (1982).
111. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, § 23.
112. Id. at 633-34.
113. 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 200.
114. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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experience.115
Rule 501 authorizes continued judicial development of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. However, the introductory phrase manifests Congress' in-
tent to leave undisturbed rules that the Supreme Court had promulgated
previously "pursuant to statutory authority." Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is a
"rule[ ] prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity." There is no indication in the legislative history of Rule 501 that
Congress intended to repeal the discovery authorization in Rule
26(b)(4)(B). Because that rule authorizes some discovery from experts
whom the opposition has decided against calling as trial witnesses, the
courts cannot extend the attorney-client privilege to bar all discovery
from such experts. In federal court and in states with rules modeled after
the pertinent provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evi-
dence, the rules preclude the courts from embracing the view that the
attorney-client privilege absolutely protects the rest of the expert's
information.
2. Public Policy
Even if the courts were writing on a clean slate, it is unwise as a matter
of public policy to extend absolute protection to all of the expert's infor-
mation about the case. As previously stated, by blurring the distinction
between the client's communications and the rest of the expert's informa-
tion, several courts have concluded that the attorney-client privilege pro-
tects all of the expert's information." 6 Reasoning from that conclusion,
those courts understandably have held that the opposing party may
neither depose the expert before trial' nor call the expert as a trial wit-
ness." 8 If all the expert's information is absolutely privileged, anything
the expert said at the deposition or trial would violate the privilege. Ulti-
mately, this line of reasoning transforms an evidentiary privilege into a
sweeping incompetency rule, completely barring any testimony by the
expert.
The decided trend in American competency law has been to relax
competency standards.' 9 Congress accelerated that trend by adopting
115. Id.
116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
119. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 61-62, 71 (3d ed. 1984).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 601.20 That rule states that "[e]very person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."1 21
Although there are rules regulating the competency of judges 122 and ju-
rors, t23 no rule even faintly suggests the complete incompetency of any
type of expert witness.
The price of rendering an expert completely incompetent is intolerably
high. By expanding the attorney-client privilege to this extreme, the
courts in effect would be allowing one party to place an expert in quaran-
tine. 124 That expansion of the attorney-client privilege enables the party
to deprive both the opposition and the trier of fact of the benefit of valua-
ble expert witnesses. ' 25 The courts should not permit one party to corner
the market on expert witnesses. 26 It is particularly unfair to do so on
the arbitrary basis that that party first consulted the expert. 27 The dras-
tic consequences of extending the attorney-client privilege to all the ex-
pert information make that extension unacceptable as a matter of policy.
3. The Majority's Misconceived Analogy
Given the history of federal privilege law and the cost of extending the
attorney-client privilege to all the expert information, it may seem sur-
prising that the majority of courts appears to have approved the exten-
sion. ' 28 However, the majority status of the doctrine attests to the power
of analogy.
In one of the seminal cases for the majority view, United States v.
Kovel, 1 29 Judge Friendly coined the analogy between interpreters and ex-
perts such as accountants. At one point in his opinion, the judge com-
pared the role of an accountant consultant to that of a "linguist"
interpreting the client's statements in a foreign language for the attor-
120. FED. R. EVID. 601.
121. Id.
122. FED. R. EvID. 605.
123. FED. R. EvID. 606.
124. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 257. See also United States v. Toledo, 25 M.J. 270
(1987), rea/f'd on rehearing, 26 M.J. 104 (1988) (the defense may not annex an expert to the defense
team).
125. United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); Pouney v. Florida, 353 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
126. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 253.
127. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 2032, at 256 n.84.
128. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
129. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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ney.130 That passage gave birth to one of the most famous analogies in
evidence law. The comparison has been repeated again and again by
courts, 31 treatise writers,' 32 and law review commentators. 33
To be sure, there is a large element of truth in the analogy. As previ-
ously noted, the attorney's lack of expertise and inability to evaluate facts
such as the client's mental condition necessitate the expert's mediation
between attorney and client. In turn, that necessity justifies treating the
client's communications with the expert as revelations to the attorney.
However, in one respect the analogy is dangerously misleading. The
interpreter's solitary function is to translate the client's oral and written
communications with the attorney. For that reason, all the interpreter's
knowledge is privileged; it consists entirely of the client's communica-
tions. The analogy has bemused courts favoring the majority view. They
have assumed simplistically that because the expert's function is analo-
gous to the interpreter's, all the expert's knowledge must be protected.
On closer scrutiny, the analogy breaks down. When the third party
intermediary is a clerk or interpreter, the intermediary performs an es-
sentially ministerial function.' Although he may relay information and
alter its form from oral to written or Spanish to English, the intermedi-
ary does not change the substantive content of the information.' 35 He is
a mere conduit of information from the client to the attorney.' 36 The
expert's role is radically different. The expert adds "an important incre-
ment" of his knowledge to evaluate the client's communications and
other case-specific information. 137 The expert does far more than a clerk
or interpreter.138 The expert creates new information 39 and thereby be-
comes an independent source of information about the case.
When a court applies the attorney-client privilege to the client's per-
sonal communications with the expert, the only information lost is the
information contained in the communications themselves; the very same
130. Id. at 922.
131. United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
132. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 209, at 751; 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 25, § 5485, at 387.
133. Casenote, supra note 69, at 104.
134. Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 160, 163 n.7 (D.D.C. 1979).
135. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 237.
136. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 463, 465.
137. Id. at 463.
138. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 237.
139. Id.
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information would have to be suppressed if the client made the state-
ments directly to the attorney. However, if the court extends the privi-
lege to the rest of the expert's information, the extension entails a loss of
additional information'": the information the expert has manufac-
tured14 by applying a theory or principle to the data in the case. The
cases extending the privilege in this manner overlook not only that addi-
tional loss of information but also the fundamental distinction between
the client's communications to the expert and the expert's other informa-
tion. In approving the discovery of a defense investigator's notes of a
third party's statement in United States v. Nobles,1 42 the Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he fact that these statements of third parties were elicited
by a defense investigator on [defendant's] behalf does not convert them
into [the defendant's] personal communications." 143 By parity of reason-
ing, the fact that information is generated by a defense expert does not
convert it into a communication from the defendant. Because it is not a
communication from the client, the rest of the expert's information in its
own right is not entitled to absolute protection under the attorney-client
privilege.
B. Is the Rest of the Expert's Information Entitled to Qualified
Protection Under the Work Product Privilege?
The last section demonstrated that the balance of the expert's informa-
tion is not entitled to an absolute privilege because it is not a communica-
tion between client and attorney; rather, it is information created by the
expert. However, one must not leap to the conclusion that the informa-
tion does not warrant any protection. Quite the contrary, precisely be-
cause of its creative origin, the information is an ideal candidate for
qualified protection under the work product privilege.
The raison d'etre of the work product doctrine is to incentivize the
creation of information for litigation. 44 In economic terms, the doctrine
is designed to stimulate the production of information useful in litiga-
tion. 145 It rewards the creative efforts of attorneys by according their
140. 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 25, § 5486, at 402.
141. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 460.
142. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
143. Id. at 234.
144. Allen, Grady, Polsby & Yashko, supra note 93; Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information. 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309.
145. Easterbrook, supra note 93.
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work product at least a qualified privilege.146 Under the doctrine, only
material reflecting the attorney's personal thought processes receives ab-
solute protection.47 However, "the cases ... make clear that the work-
product [also] protects the confidentiality of work that is not strictly the
lawyer's .... 4 The doctrine likewise operates when the attorney em-
ploys aides to create information."l 9 In Nobles, 5 ' although the Court
granted the prosecution discovery of the defense investigator's notes, the
Court did so on the theory that the defense waived the work product
privilege by calling the investigator as a witness.1 5' The Court acknowl-
edged that, as a practical matter, attorneys "must rely on the assistance
of investigators and other agents" to generate the information needed for
trial. 152
The same reasoning applies to the expert's information other than the
client's communications. At the attorney's request, the expert manufac-
tures new information by applying her expertise to the case-specific
facts. 153 To continue the economic metaphor, this is precisely the type of
productive manufacturing activity that the work product doctrine is
designed to stimulate. Several courts1 54 and commentators' 55 have rec-
ognized that the conditional work product doctrine-not the attorney-
client privilege-should regulate the discoverability of the balance of the
expert's information. To encourage attorneys to employ experts to create
useful legal information, the courts should accord the expert's informa-
tion a qualified privilege. The courts can accommodate the opposing
party's legitimate interests by giving the opposition the opportunity to
defeat the privilege by establishing a special need for the expert's
information.1 56
146. Allen, Grady, Polsby & Yashko, supra note 93.
147. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
148. Allen, Grady, Polsby & Yashko, supra note 93.
149. Id., at - n.94 (citing Sersted v. American Can Co., 535 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(investigator)); Dingier v. Halcyon Lijn N.V., 50 F.R.D. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Exparte May, 393 So,
2d 1006 (Ala. 1981) (insurance adjuster); Long Drug Stores v. Howe, 134 Ariz. 424, 657 P.2d 412
(1983); Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970).
150. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
151. Id. at 236-40.
152. Id. at 238.
153.. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 460.
154. Id. (citing cases); Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
155. 2 J. HoGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 237; Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 473.
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)('exceptional circumstances"); Comment, supra note 39 at
355.
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III. THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF THE REST OF THE EXPERT'S
INFORMATION IN LIGHT OF ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
CLIENT'S DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH
THE EXPERT
The first part of this Article advanced the thesis that the attorney-
client privilege absolutely protects the client's direct communications
with the expert. Hence, the prosecution has no right to discover the
parts of the expert's report reflecting those communications or to force
the expert to divulge those communications at a deposition or trial.
However, the client's communications are not the full extent of the ex-
pert's knowledge of the case. The expert's information also includes
other case-specific facts and the theory the expert relies on to evaluate the
significance of the facts. For instance, the psychiatrist's report may not
only recite the client's statements and the psychiatrist's observations of
the client's mental condition but may also refer to third parties' descrip-
tions of the client's behavior and the symptomatology for a particular
mental disorder. The second part of this Article concluded that the lat-
ter information falls outside the attorney-client privilege. The informa-
tion qualifies as conditional work product material, but the opposing
party can override the work product privilege by demonstrating a com-
pelling need for the information. The upshot is that, in our hypothetical,
the prosecutor might be entitled to discover all of the expert's report
other than the parts describing the client's statements and the psychia-
trist's observations of the client's mental state. Likewise, at a deposition
or trial, the prosecutor could question the psychiatrist to elicit that
information.
Permitting the prosecution to ask those questions and inspect those
sections of the expert's report would satisfy the prosecution's discovery
needs. The prosecution is entitled to learn only the unprivileged case-
specific facts in the expert's possession and the expert's insight involving
a certain scientific theory or principle she finds potentially applicable to
the case. In our hypothetical, the prosecution thus may discover third
parties' descriptions of the client's behavior and the expert's conclusion
that the defendant may suffer from only a mild form of neurosis. The
prosecution has no right to discover the expert's information which func-
tionally amounts to communications between client and attorney. At
first blush, this discovery may seem limited. However, in most jurisdic-
tions prosecutors would be delighted to obtain that extent of discovery.
Under the majority view today, the defense has a powerful argument that
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all of the expert's information is protected absolutely under the attorney-
client privilege. 57 Prosecutors would view the adoption of the concep-
tion of the attorney-client privilege proposed by this Article as a distinct
improvement over the status quo.
Defense attorneys in jurisdictions currently following the majority
view likely will voice the strongest objections to this Article's position.
They may object that, in its own right, the rest of the expert's informa-
tion is entitled to an absolute privilege. But, the distinction between the
client's communications and the rest of the expert's information is so
fundamental that their objection would border on the frivolous. A more
serious contention, however, is that although the distinction may be clear
in theory, in practice it will be extremely difficult to segregate absolutely
privileged communications from the other expert information entitled to
only conditional protection. Based on that contention, defense counsel
may urge courts to cloak all expert information with an absolute
privilege.
More specifically, the defense contention could take the form of two
related arguments. Defense counsel may argue initially that the two
types of information are likely to be so inextricably interwined in the
expert's report and mind that they cannot realistically be severed. The
defense may attempt to characterize the expert information in a given
report as linguistically inseparable. Defense counsel may contend further
that even when it is linguistically feasible to segregate the two types of
information, grave problems still exist. Before trial, the disclosure of the
remaining expert information might give the prosecution valuable inves-
tigative leads. In addition, if the prosecution calls the expert as a witness
at trial, the trier of fact may give undue weight to the fact that the de-
fense earlier consulted the same expert. This part of the Article consid-
ers the merits of those two arguments.
A. The Possibility of Segregating the Two Types of Expert Information
At first, this defense argument may seem counterintuitive. If a party
knowingly intermeshes conditionally privileged information with abso-
lutely privileged information, logic certainly does not demand that all the
information be deemed absolutely privileged. To the contrary, one can
argue plausibly that the party has assumed the risk of waiving the abso-
lute protection for the latter information. The party should realize that
157. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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he is intermingling otherwise absolutely protected material with material
which the opposing party can discover on a proper showing of need. The
party runs the risk that the judge will find the opposing party has the
requisite need and therefore order the discovery of all the intertwined
information.
Nevertheless, the defense argument has a solid basis in precedent. The
case law governing two privileges, the federal privilege for confidential
government deliberations and the privilege for an informer's identity,
supports the defense argument. The federal courts recognize a limited
predecisional, deliberative privilege.1 58 The purpose of the privilege is to
encourage candor in government decisionmaking: if government deci-
sionmakers are generally assured confidentiality, theoretically their inter-
nal discussions will be franker, and the end product-the final
government decision-will be of higher quality.159 The privilege ordina-
rily protects only advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations
that are an integral part of the decisionmaking process.16 It usually does
not apply to raw, factual data the government gathers during decision-
making.1 6' However, some cases extend the privilege's protection to fac-
tual data when the data is so intertwined with protected opinions that
they cannot feasibly be segregated.162
The cases on the informer's privilege also lend support to the defense
argument. To encourage persons to report law violations to government
agencies, the courts have fashioned a conditional privilege for the in-
former's identity. 163 The courts usually limit the scope of the privilege to
the informer's identity itself;I'4 this is the information which, if disclosed,
could enable a criminal to retaliate against the informer. The privilege
ordinarily does not extend to the content of the informer's report. 165
158. Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908
(1984).
159. R. CARLSON, E. IMWlNKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 716.
160. Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
161. Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 923, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1981). See also Ryan v. Dep't
of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
162. Dow Jones & Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 724 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. 1989); Corporacion
Insular de Seguros v. Garcia, 709 F.Supp. 288, 296 (D.P.R. 1989); Howard & Crowley, Part 11:
Litigation-Chapter 3: Pleading, Discovery, and Pretrial Procedure for Litigation Against Govern-
ment Spying, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 931, 970 (1978).
163. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 111 (3d ed. 1984).
164. E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 1710, at 440 (1987).
165. Id.
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However, in rare cases the contents of the report are such that, for all
practical purposes, their revelation would enable the criminal to identify
the informant. In these cases the courts have held that the report and the
informer's identity are so closely intertwined that the privilege must be
expanded to encompass the report as well. 166
Assume arguendo that, as a matter of law, the absolute attorney-client
privilege should apply to all the expert information if it is infeasible to
separate the client's communications from the rest of the expert informa-
tion. Even given this legal assumption, the defense argument for an ab-
solute privilege is factually flawed: in almost all cases, it will be feasible
to segregate the two types of expert information.
In the past, the courts have found it possible to draw similar lines be-
tween types of expert information.167 Before the 1970 amendment to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, some courts employed a "property
right" theory to decide the discoverability of expert information.1 68
Under the theory, the expert had a property right in her expertise. Her
opinions and conclusions were protected because the expert necessarily
had employed her property-her expertise-to generate the opinions. 169
However, the factual data gathered by the expert was unprotected be-
cause the expert did not use her expertise to create that data. 170 Thus,
under the old "property right" theory, the judge had to sever the expert
report roughly along the lines advocated by this Article.
In one context, the courts continue to draw the same severance line
under Rule 26. Suppose that a party to a lawsuit employs an in-house
expert on her regular payroll. In the normal course of his duties, the
expert gains some factual information which becomes relevant in a later
lawsuit. When the lawsuit is filed, the party asks the employee to use his
expertise to evaluate the significance of the factual information. Abun-
dant case law holds that the courts should treat the expert as an ordinary
witness to the extent that he acquired factual data in the normal course
of work before litigation was anticipated.7 1 The opposing party then can
discover the factual data without showing any particular need; the data
is discoverable so long as it is logically relevant to the subject matter of
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., In re Investment Bankers, Inc., 30 Bankr. 883, 889 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (sepa-
rating an investigator's opinions from the "largely factual, investigative information" in a report).
168. Graham, supra note 104, at 935; Long, supra note 17, at 671.
169. Graham, supra note 104, at 935.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 936.
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the litigation. 172 However, the expert also has formed opinions about the
significance of the factual data. The cases hold that, under Rule 26, these
opinions constitute work product material and the opposing party must
show need to discover them. 173 When the party cannot establish suffi-
cient need, this line of authority requires the lower court judge to sever
the protected opinions from the discoverable factual data. 174
Because it has proven feasible for discovery judges to draw the lines
just described, judges also should be able to draw the line with respect to
an expert's report. Again, an expert's evaluation of the facts in a case is
syllogistic. 175 The expert's starting point is a major premise such as a set
of diagnostic criteria for a particular mental illness. The minor premise
is the case-specific information, perhaps including the client's statements,
the psychiatrist's observations of the client's mental condition, and third
parties' descriptions of the client's behavior and mental state. The expert
applies the diagnostic criteria to the case-specific information and
thereby derives an opinion about the client's sanity. The only material
in the report entitled to absolute protection is the information consisting
of client communications, namely, the client's statements and the psychi-
atrist's observations of the client's condition. All the other material qual-
ifies only for conditional work product protection, and hence the
prosecution can discover it upon an appropriate showing of need. In a
good forensic report, the expert will segregate hard factual data, such as
a client's statements, from the evaluative parts of the analysis. 176
In United States v. Nobles,1 7 7 the Supreme Court approved a procedure
similar to the procedure urged by this Article. In that case, the lower
court informed the parties that it would examine the investigator's report
in camera and make any necessary excisions. 178 The examination estab-
lished that the report did not "reflect[ ] any information that [the defend-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 941-42.
174. Id.; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 2033, at 125-26 (Supp. 1988) (citing
Tahoe Ins. Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 84 F.R.D. 362 (D. Idaho 1979) and Nelco Corp. v. Slater
Elec. Inc., 80 F.R.D. 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)).
175. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Stucture of Scientific Testi-
mony, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1988).
176. For discussions of the appropriate format of a forensic analysis, see R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER
& J. RuBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 119-30 (rev. ed. 1975); P. GIANNELLI & E.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19-3, at 692-702 (1986) (medical examiner's report).
177. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
178. Id. at 229.
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ant personally] conveyed to the investigator . . .. ,"I" Justice Brennan
joined in Justice Powell's lead opinion stressing that the statements re-
flected in the investigator's report were not "personal communications"
from the defendant.1 80
Even in the rare cases in which severance is impractical, there is still a
remedy short of extending the attorney-client privilege to all the expert
information: adapting the summary procedure authorized by the 1980
Classified Information Procedures Act.'81 Suppose that a defendant
seeks discovery of a document referring to state or military secrets. Fur-
thermore, the secrets are so intermingled with the unprivileged matter in
the document that it is infeasible to segregate the unprivileged matter by
redacting the references to the secrets. In that event, the Act allows the
government to prepare a summary of the document's contents, deleting
all mention of the secrets. The summary must give the defendant ade-
quate discovery of the unprivileged contents of the document. The judge
makes an in camera comparison of the document and the summary to
ensure the summary's adequacy.
Courts can apply this procedure by analogy to reports containing ex-
pert information. In the infrequent cases in which the privileged client
communications cannot be separated from the conditionally protected
work product, the defense may prepare a summary of the report, omit-
ting any reference to the client communications. As under the Classified
Information Procedures Act, the judge then could review the summary
to make certain that it did not withhold any relevant information other
than client communications. This combination of severance and sum-
mary techniques should give the client's communications to the expert
workable, ample protection.
B. Other Practical Problems Which Will Arise If the Court Protects
the Client's Communications with the Expert But Allows the
Prosecution to Discover the Other Expert Information
Even when the client's communications and the other expert informa-
tion are linguistically separable, defense counsel may argue that the court
nevertheless should protect other expert information absolutely. Counsel
179. Id. at 234.
180. Id.
181. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (1982); E. IMWINKELRIED, P.
GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1709 (1987).
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will argue that the linguistic severability does not eliminate two other
practical problems.
One problem arises before trial: granting the prosecution discovery of
the other expert information sometimes will give the prosecution "strong
clues"'8 2 about the absolutely protected information. For instance, sup-
pose that, after a showing of need, the judge grants the prosecution dis-
covery of the part of a psychiatric report applying the diagnostic criteria
to the case-specific facts. That part of the report may refer to a symptom
precluding a diagnosis of psychosis. The prosecution cannot discover the
client's communication admitting the symptom, but the rest of the report
may alert the prosecution to the possibility of conducting a factual inves-
tigation to establish that symptom. The defense will argue that the
judge's discovery order breaches the confidentiality of the absolutely pro-
tected material and that the only proper course is to extend the attorney-
client privilege to all the expert information.
This defense argument misconceives the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. Most constitutional exclusionary rules, such as the rule enforc-
ing the prohibition against unreasonable searches, have two components.
One component is the basic rule excluding the illegally obtained evidence
itself. ' 3 To use Justice Frankfurter's expression, the prosecution may
not introduce the "poisonous tree"-the illegally seized object or the un-
lawfully coerced confession.' 84 The second component is the derivative
evidence rule: to maximize the deterrence of police misconduct, the rule
also forbids the prosecution from introducing the "fruit of the poisonous
tree."' 85 Thus, if the police use the illegally obtained object or confession
as an investigative lead and that lead takes them directly to other evi-
dence, the derivative evidence is inadmissible against the defendant.' 86
In contrast, common-law and statutory privileges such as the attorney-
client privilege lack a derivative evidence component.1 8 7 For example,
assume that an attorney breaches confidentiality by informing the police
that the defendant told him that the defendant confessed her guilt to her
brother. The police follow up on the investigative lead and contact the
182. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 250.
183. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 165 (3d ed. 1984).
184. Id. § 176 (citing Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).
185. Id.
186. E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, supra note 164, §§ 2201-
03,
187. Id. § 1605, at 399-400 (citing United States v. Seiber, 31 C.M.R. 106 (1961)); State v.
Sandini, 395 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982)).
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brother, who agrees to testify against the defendant. Had the police ob-
tained the investigative lead about the defendant's brother by violating
the fourth amendment, the derivative evidence component of the consti-
tutional exclusionary rule might bar the prosecution from calling the
brother as a trial witness.188 However, the defendant cannot suppress the
brother's testimony on the theory that the police obtained the testimony
from a violation of the attorney-client privilege. 89 The attorney-client
doctrine is merely a common-law privilege. Because the privilege lacks
constitutional status, the courts refuse to enforce the privilege by the ex-
traordinary remedy of suppressing even evidence derived from a viola-
tion of the privilege.
Defense counsel correctly point out that granting the prosecution dis-
covery of expert information other than the client's communications with
the expert occasionally will give the prosecution indirect investigative
leads about privileged information. However, as just noted, the scope of
the exclusionary rule enforcing common-law and statutory privileges is
narrower than that of the constitutional exclusionary rules. Even when
the police obtain a direct investigative lead through a violation of the
attorney-client privilege, they can use that lead to discover independent,
admissable evidence. A fortiori, when the police obtain an indirect inves-
tigative lead from the disclosed portions of a defense expert's report and
they use the lead to derive independent evidence, that evidence should
not be suppressed. Giving the government indirect investigative leads
may place a strain on the attorney-client privilege; but standing alone, it
cannot be considered a violation of the privilege.
A second problem can arise at trial. Assume the prosecution calls the
former defense consultant as a witness. During the witness' direct exami-
nation, the prosecutor may attempt to elicit the fact that the defense at-
torney and the defendant earlier consulted the witness. The previous
consultation is logically relevant to the witness' credibility. The witness'
willingness to discuss the case with the defense is some evidence of the
witness' lack of bias against the defendant. On direct examination of an
expert, attorneys commonly elicit the expert's testimony that, in the past,
the expert has testified for both sides-plaintiffs as well as defendants, or
188. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, supra note 164, § 2211.
189. E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, supra note 164, § 1605.
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prosecution as well as defense."' 0 However, there is a probative danger
in admitting that testimony. The jury may treat the testimony as evi-
dence that the defense admits the witness is an authoritative expert and
give the testimony undue weight.1 91
As in the case of the pretrial problem of giving the prosecution investi-
gative leads, this problem admits of a less drastic solution than sup-
pressing all expert information. As several commentators have
suggested, the trial judge could admonish the prosecutor and expert to
refrain from any mention of the defense's previous consultation with the
witness.19 The admonition can be justified under the legal relevance
doctrine, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 193 That statute al-
lows the judge to exclude logically relevant evidence when, in the judge's
estimation, the admission of the evidence will create a substantial risk
that the jury will decide the case on an improper basis. 194 Relevant evi-
dence poses that risk when the trier of fact will probably overvalue the
probative worth of the evidence.' 95 If the jury is likely to ascribe too
much significance to the defense's earlier consultation with this prosecu-
tion witness, 196 Rule 403 empowers the judge to bar any mention of the
fact.
If mention of the fact slips out during the expert's direct examination,
the defense would not be without remedies. The defense can move to
strike the mention and to have the judge give the jury a curative instruc-
tion to disregard. 197 Even when a witness refers to prejudicial, inadmissi-
ble evidence, a strongly worded curative instruction from the judge can
provide a sufficient antidote. 198 If even a curative instruction is unlikely
190. See, e.g., R. CARLSON & E. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS § 11.10, at 193-94 (1989).
191. Graham, supra note 80, at 196.
192. Id. at 195-96; Comment, supra note 39, at 370.
193. FED. R. EVID. 403.
194. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
195. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U. C. DAVIS L. REV.
59, 81 (1984); Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV.
879, 895 (1988); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1977); Travers, An
Essay on the Determination of Relevancy Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
327, 328, 344.
196. Graham, supra note 80, at 196.
197. See generally R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 72. See also
R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND
CASES 124 (1989).
198. E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 9:55 (1984).
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to undo the damage caused by the reference to the inadmissible matter,
the defense may move for a mistrial.1 99 As a practical matter, the judge
is more likely to grant a mistrial motion when she senses that the witness
or attorney deliberately injected the inadmissible material into the rec-
ord.2" Both the prosecuting attorney and the expert witness are trained
professionals. This professional status may make it difficult for the pros-
ecutor or expert witness to convince the judge that a reference to the
defense's pretrial consultation with the 9xpert was inadvertent and
innocent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges will not always find it easy to implement the solution recom-
mended in this Article. Justice Holmes was correct when he stated that
judges are always drawing lines, but some lines are harder to draw than
others. Given a case in which the judge finds the prosecution has made
the requisite showing of need to discover the work product material in a
defense expert's report, the judge may find it difficult to redact the refer-
ences to protected communications without rendering the rest of the re-
port incomprehensible. If so, a good deal of time may be consumed by
the defense preparation of a summary of the report and the judge's re-
view of the summary. However, even with these concessions, the solu-
tion urged in this Article is still superior at several levels to the current
majority view in the United States.
Distinguishing between the client's communications with the expert
and other expert information is a preferable solution to the problem of
expert discovery. The current majority view has converted a narrow
privilege doctrine into a broad incompetency rule, slighting the opposing
attorney's discovery needs. Even if one jettisons the majority view, the
work product doctrine still will give the other expert information a sub-
stantial degree of protection. Many respected authorities complain that,
at least in civil cases, the existing work product protection for expert
information is excessive. 20 1 Numerous courts have held that when the
attorney does not intend to call the expert as a witness, the opposition
cannot discover even the expert's identity without a showing of excep-
199. R. CARLSON & E. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS § 15.3 (1989).
200. Id.
201. E.g., McLaughlin, Discovery and Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 760 (1988) (the author is a district judge for the Eastern District of New York).
[Vol. 68:19
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss1/3
DISCOVERY: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
tional need.z°: In practice, the opposition is rarely able to satisfy the
burden of proving exceptional need.2" 3 The judge is likely to find the
showing insufficient unless the party seeking discovery can show that the
expert had unusual qualifications 2" or that the expert analyzed an object
which has since been altered, precluding another expert from duplicating
the earlier test.20 5 The courts have so severely restricted discovery of
work product material from experts not called as trial witnesses 0 6 that
adding the protection of the attorney-client privilege is hardly necessary.
The majority view is undesirable at another level. The majority view
not only represents an unsound solution to the privilege problem of
expert discovery; it also tends to distort privilege law in general. One of
the key concepts in privilege law is the definition of communication. 0 7
That concept helps define the scope of not only the attorney-client privi-
lege, but also the physician-patient,208 psychotherapist-patient, 20 9 and
spousal21° privileges. The majority view has distorted the concept by
stretching it beyond any sensible limit.211 That distortion may create ad-
ditional mischief by spilling over into the law governing the other privi-
leges employing the same concept.
Most important, the majority view impedes progress toward the devel-
opment of criminal discovery as a two-way street. Many commentators
advocate more liberal discovery for the criminal defendant.212 Justice
Brennan's 1963 Article in this journal is one of the most eloquent pleas in
favor of expanded discovery for the defense,213 and his 1989 Tyrrell Wil-
202. Mack v. Moore, 91 N.C. App. 478, 372 S.E.2d 314 (1988); 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10,
§ 13.12, at 255; Comment, supra note 39, at 351; Note, supra note 110, at 517.
203. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 2032, at 256; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032, at 122-23 (Supp. 1988).
204. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 253; Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 484.
205. Freidenthal, supra note 17, at 484; 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.12, at 252; 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 2032, at 256 n.87; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032, at 123 (Supp. 1988).
206. Graham, supra note 80.
207. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, supra note 8, at 610-11.
208. Id. at 660-61.
209. Id. at 665-68.
210. Id. at 620-23.
211. 2 J. HOGAN, supra note 10, § 13.10, at 238.
212. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J. 477;
Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L.
REV. 127 (1963); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56
(1961).
213. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 279.
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liams Lecture reiterates that plea with renewed urgency.214 Justice Bren-
nan joined Justice Powell's Nobles opinion in repudiating the view that
criminal discovery should be a one-way street.215 The majority view of
the application of the attorney-client privilege to expert information has
become a serious obstacle to the transformation of criminal discovery
into a two-way street. That obstacle must be removed.
214. Brennan, supra note 2.
215. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975).
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